MSC – Controlling the medium controlling the message?

Although technically a non-profit, the Marine Stewardship Council is a for-profit organization – the profit being used to expand the scope and influence of the Council. 

A new area of expansion is the creation of an online fisheries science research library.

http://www.msc.org/newsroom/news/msc-launches-fisheries-science-research-library

The “library” is essentially a new eJournal called “MSC Science Series”.  It will be published biannually and the first volume is now online.

http://www.msc.org/business-support/science-series/volume-01-1

The MSC Science Series provides a medium for publishing the results of MSC funded research related to the MSC standard for sustainable fisheries and marine ecosystems.  The review and editorial panels comprise mainly MSC staffers and insiders.

Fisheries and marine ecosystem sciences are already well served by a number of online scientific journals, both those with a long-standing tradition in paper form and a number of recently added eJournals. 

These journals pride themselves on having independent and objective peer review processes.  It is questionable whether there is a real need for a new eJournal, particularly one in which the review and editorial process is tightly controlled by the hosting organization.

Informed criticism of the MSC process has come mainly from fisheries scientists and ecologists who have questioned the data, methods and results of some MSC sustainability determinations.  A number of these have been published in independent peer reviewed journals.  In contrast, there have been few papers in support of the MSC approach written by scientists who are completely independent of the MSC process.

Rather than working on establishing the scientific legitimacy of its data, methods and results through the existing independent peer reviewed literature, the MSC is hoping to further its cause by creating a quasi-scientific medium in which the message will be closely controlled and favourable to the MSC. 

In some ways this is similar to another MSC institution, the quasi-legal Objections Procedure in which “Independent Adjudicators” hired by MSC to adjudicate on objections to MSC sustainability determinations invariably decide in favor of the MSC and against the objectors. 

Ironically, the objectors are typically groups and associations of scientists and environmentalists citing information published in the peer reviewed scientific literature!

Fisheries Ministers lost their authority to MSC in a coup de'etat in 2008?

Dr. Doug Butterworth, a retired academic and fisheries consultant from a South African university, recently made the claim at an international marine conference that fisheries ministers around the world lost their authority in a coup de'etat in 2008 when the MSC succeeded in persuading major European supermarkets to only purchase MSC certified products. This claim was made during a key-note address at the September 2013 ICES (International Council for Exploration of the Sea) Annual Science Conference in Reykjavík (min 41:38 onwards)‎.

Butterworth says that prior to this the MSC was in the doldrums but in 2008 there was a quiet revolution in which fisheries ministers did not even realize that they had surrendered their authority on national fisheries policy to the MSC.  Butterworth states that this resulted in an explosion in applications for MSC certification.

Butterworth argues that although MSC is only dealing with 10% of the World's fisheries, the process is so burdensome that it is draining scientific expertise in stock assessments to produce MSC reviews of variable consistency.  Butterworth claims that the MSC review process is inferior to processes such as the review that takes place in ICES in providing scientific advice on the management of European fish stocks.

This view adds to the debate recently rekindled in Alaska over salmon certification - should MSC be second-guessing national and international processes already in place to provide scientific assessments, review and advice on meeting sustainability criteria?  If ICES scientists provide advice to managers on how to manage a European fishery in a sustainable manner and managers follow this advice, what added value does MSC really have?

Is sustainable seafood really sustainable?

A recently published paper in the journal Marine Policy by German scientists Rainer Froese and Alexander Proelss has attracted the attention of the Washington Post and other media. 

The paper takes issue with sustainability certifications of marine fisheries by the Marine Stewardship Council and the Friends of the Sea.

 

They examined the most recent estimates of current biomass, (B) biomass at maximum sustainable yield (Bmsy), current fishing mortality (F) and fishing mortality at MSY (Fmsy) from national or international fisheries bodies and published papers for 71 MSC certified stocks for which they could find such information.

 

For 11% of these stocks the information was insufficient to make a judgement about stock status or exploitation levels.  31% of the stocks with sufficient information were overfished and were currently subject to overfishing.

 

They define “overfished” as those stocks where B is less than Bmsy and "overfishing" as taking place when F exceeds Fmsy.  They allow some latitude in that if the ratio B/Bmsy is  greater than 0.9 or F/Fmsy is less than1.1 it is not included in the percentage total of overfished and overfishing.

National fisheries agencies and international fisheries organizations tend to be somewhat coy regarding their specific definition of sustainability with respect to marine fisheries.
  

The US, under the Magnuson–Stevens Act, is an exception in this regard although the criteria may vary somewhat on a stock by stock basis.  Commonly the US definition of “overfishing” is the same as that adopted by Froese and Proelss (F>Fmsy) but the US tends to be more tolerant with regard to the definition of overfished, commonly requiring the stock to  be above 50% of Bmsy or 50% of maximum spawner potential (spawner per recruit).

Under Principle 1 of their standard, MSC ideally requires that fisheries are managed so that they fluctuate around Bmsy or higher although stocks can still be certified under this criterion if they are above 50%Bmsy.  Of course there are many MSC loopholes around this that allow fisheries to be certified even where there are no reliable estimates of where the stock is relative to these levels.  Fmsy does not factor directly into the MSC certification standard, so that it is feasible that fisheries in which overfishing is taking place, such that the stock will be depleted over time, can still be certified as sustainable.

While Froese and Proelss may raise the bar a little too high, stocks that are consistently below Bmsy or are being fished consistently above Fmsy should not be given sustainable fishery labels.  Also, data poor fisheries cannot be assumed to be sustainably managed based on vague and subjective notions.  The fact that overfished stocks subject to overfishing, as well as data-poor stocks, are being certified as “sustainable” brings into question current standards.

National fishery agencies and international organizations would serve us well by developing clear globally accepted and simply applied standards for what constitutes a sustainable fishery. Fisheries that are shown to meet such standards through scientific peer review of assessment of stock status would not be in need of further sustainability accreditation.

Former MSC head spills the fish guts on the Alaskan salmon pullout

A former head of the MSC has commented publicly on the pullout from the certification scheme by the Alaskan salmon industry.  He questions whether it is a kamikaze move or a considered action.   He notes that nobody expected a stalwart of the MSC certification scheme to abandon ship at the height of the eco-certification bubble.  

But maybe that bubble is about to burst?   Has the asymptote been reached?  Have the cumulative cases of questionable MSC certifications finally reached the point where the brand is beginning to lose value? 

Brendan May gives us a rare peak into the dilemma that MSC faces on a daily basis trying to play environmental groups off against commercial enterprises.  He recounts the hours spent by MSC figuring out how to kick a fishery out of the programme so Greenpeace and others might stop thinking they were a front for the industry or a satanic incarnation.  But very few fisheries have been kicked out.

The MSC certification of the Canadian longline swordfish fishery a few days ago further weakens the MSC brand.  Despite the objection of environmental groups, MSC has certified a fishery in which, it is claimed, two sharks die are cuaght for every swordfish caught (some percentage of which survive on release) and which causes 200- 500 endangered sea turtles to breathe their last every year.

As environmental groups have been quick to point out, not many people would be happy to sit down to a meal of MSC certified longline swordfish knowing that it comes with a side dish of endangered turtle and shark.

Alaskan salmon processors dump MSC

This is already old news, but it may be instructive to look at the reasons given by the Alaska salmon industry for dumping  MSC after more than a decade, and the response from MSC, now that the fish guts have settled somewhat, so to speak.

Among the reasons given by the Alaskan salmon industry, the Alaskan Fisheries Development Foundation and the Alaskan government, as reported by http://thefishsite.com and other media, is that MSC certification does not, in itself, make Alaskan salmon sustainable.  They consider the salmon fishery to already be sustainable because it meets State and Federal constitutional mandates for sustained yield, a commitment to scientific research and the need serve public good.   

According to http://www.upi.com/ the industry were also frustrated with the increasing complexity of MSC certification.  No doubt cost is also a factor – not only for the certification itself, but also for annual audits and the right to display the eco-label.  Although a non-profit, MSC has been able to fund considerable global expansion over the last decade through fixed annual fees and variable royalties based on how much MSC-labelled seafood is sold, as well as through donations.

MSC has not welcomed being dumped and has been quick to express its chagrin.  It considers that whatever alternative certification and eco-labelling scheme the industry comes up with, it will be inferior with regard to independence, transparency, traceablity and quality, attributes MSC has put forward to establish global brand identity.

Is the Alaskan salmon industry in the vanguard of a swing away from MSC certification? There is no doubt that MSC certification is highly complex and expensive.  Is MSC certification necessary for a fishery to be considered sustainable?

It all depends.  Nations like the United States and New Zealand have clear standards embodied in policy and legislation regarding when overfishing is taking place or when a stock is overfished.  If a fishery does not meet both of these standards then it is, by definition, not a sustainable fishery.  This is typically determined by federal or state scientific stock assessments through an independent peer review process in a transparent manner.  Provided the providence of products from sustainable fisheries is made clear in the labelling by indicating the fishery geographic stock location, scientific species name and capture gear type, the consumer has sufficient information to make an informed decision.

Typically MSC accredited consulting companies do no new analysis in reaching their sustainability determination.  Rather, they piggy-back on the federal or state scientific assessment, adding additional qualitative insights regarding ecological impact of the fishery and governance considerations.  In an MSC assessment a fishery on an overfished stock or a fishery that is overfishing the stock can be granted “conditional” sustainability certification and can carry the MSC eco-label provided it has plans to become sustainable with regard to the MSC standard within a prescribed period.  Thus a fishery can be deemed provisionally sustainable under MSC while considered unsustainable under USA or NZ federal standards.

Does the MSC label provide sufficient information for the consumer to make a wise choice?  Typically it does not.   There are 5 choices of text that MSC provides to accompany their blue eco-label.  None of these contain any information on the geographic stock location of the fishery, the scientific name of the species, or the fishing gear used.  There is also nothing to distinguish fisheries that have conditional sustainability certification from those that meet all the MSC criteria.  Consumers must take the MSC eco-label on faith or visit the MSC website and do their own research to determine these important details.

Marine fish stocks are a public resource and it is the responsibility of governments to manage this resource for long term public good.  Nations like the USA and NZ are well advanced in this regard and don’t have need of third party eco-certification to augment their own legislation, policy and procedures.  They only need to work on improving the communication of this information to the public.  Detailed product labelling, including whether or not the product meets both sustainability criteria (not overfished and overfishing not taking place), would allow consumers to make wise choices on sustainable seafood. 

MSC Sustainable Fisheries Certification Works says new report

In October 2010 MSC announced that it had selected, from the various contract bidders, MRAG Ltd to undertake the first detailed analysis of the environmental impacts that have resulted from the first ten years of MSC’s fishery certification program.  MRAG was supported in this contract by Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd and Meridian Prime Ltd. 

These consulting companies have recently submitted their joint report.  You get what you pay for so no surprise that the report concluded that MSC eco-certification really works. 

The media release states that this is an “independent” study.  Not so.  MRAG Ltd. is a consulting company heavily engaged in the MSC certification game.  Further, one of the report authors, David Agnew, is a long time MSC insider as Chair of the Technical Advisory Board and is now on staff as MSC Director of Standards.

The study focuses on improvements in eight outcome performance indicators: stock status; population reference points; stock recovery; retained species; bycatch species; endangered, threatened and protected (ETP) species; habitats and environments.

Improvements were purported to have been evidenced over the period commencing with the secret MSC pre-assessment, through assessment and into the certification.

The conclusion from the study was that MSC works.

Erik Stokstad, writing in Science is not convinced. Scoring is subjective and there is no control study (i.e. how did fisheries not under MSC certification progress over the same period?).

While MSC continues to certify fisheries that are data-deficient, clearly not sustainable or which cause unacceptable collateral damage on other components of the ecosystem we, the resource owners, should reserve judgement regarding the efficacy of the program. 

Objections stall MSC certifications of US and Canadian swordfish

Two bids for MSC sustainability certification by pelagic longline fisheries on swordfish have run into objections.  These objections are currently under “adjudication” by an MSC appointed “Independent Adjudicator”.

The two fisheries seeking certification are the North West Atlantic Canada Longline Swordfish backed by the consulting company Intertek Moody Marine Ltd. and the Southeast US North Atlantic Swordfish Fishery backed by the consulting company MRAG Americas.

These consulting companies are heavy hitters who don’t take kindly to obstacles being placed in the way of their clients and they are fighting back.

Moody was acquired by Intertek for US$730 million in March 2011.  Moody itself swallowed smaller Canadian competitor TAVEL Certification Inc. in December 2009.   

MRAG Americas is sister company to MRAG Ltd. in the UK which is owned by Sir John Beddington, chief scientific advisor to the UK Government.  Sir John is not without controversy.  The president of MRAG Americas is Andrew Rosenberg, a post doctoral assistant to Beddington at Imperial College London in the early 1990s.  Rosenberg went on to become the deputy director of NOAA’s NMFS before leaving to form MRAG Americas.  He is currently also special advisor to Jane Lubchenco, Undersecretary of Commerce and Administrator of NOAA.

The objection to the Canadian longline fishery certification was filed by The Ecology Action Centre (EAC), The David Suzuki Foundation, Oceana and the Sea Turtle Conservancy on 20 September 2011.  The objection to the US Longine fishery was filed by the Turtle Island Restoration Network (TIRN) on 27 September 2011 and is supported by Wider Caribbean Sea Turtle Conservation Network (WIDECAST), Oceana, Center for Biological Diversity, Ecology Action Centre and the Animal Welfare Institute.

The objections cite what have become standard concerns regarding the “lowering of the bar” by consulting companies in favor of their clients when it comes to MSC Principle 1. This principle requires evidence of sustainable management strategies that meet the UNFA Precautionary Approach requirements.  Procedural issues with regard to the certifications are also raised in the objections.

More importantly, the objections take task under MSC Principle 2 regarding the impact, and lack of monitoring, of indiscriminate pelagic longline fisheries on bycatch species, particularly those species that fall into the ETP category (endangered, threatened or protected).

Of particular concern are species like Shortfin Mako shark, Porbeagle shark, Loggerhead turtle and Leatherback turtle.  The Committee on the Status of Endangerd Wildlife  in Canada considers Shortfin Mako shark to be “Threatened” while Porbeagle shark, Loggerhead and Leatherback turtles are considered “Endangered”.  Under the US Endangered Species Act, Loggerhead turtles are considered “Threatened” and Leatherback turtles “Endangered”. 

In addition to ETP species the additive impact of swordfish longline fisheries on overfished tuna species is a concern, especially on Bluefin tuna, off both the US and Canada.

As MSC appointed and salaried lawyer Wylie Spicer mulls over both objections, as well as stakeholder submissions and the ardent counter-responses of Intertek Moody and MRAG Americas, before coming to his “verdict” as the "independent adjudicator" under the complicated pseudo-legal objection procedure put in place by MSC, remember what is at stake.

Swordfish and bycatch species are public property and should be managed for our long-term public good, and those of our children and their children.  This includes non-use value such as biodiversity.  If bycatch species are threatened by pelagic linetrawl swordfish fisheries then we are the losers if these objections fail.    

If you like to eat swordfish, remember that there is an alternative to the indiscriminate pelagic linetrawl that you can source.   The North West Atlantic Canada harpoon swordfish fishery was certified sustainable by MSC in June 2010.  It has zero bycatch.

Additional information on the Southeast US swordfish certification objection here 

Is the Newfoundland Grand Bank shrimp fishery sustainable?

The large boat northern shrimp Pandalus borealis fisheries off the east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador (Canada) have just received MSC eco-certification as sustainable.  Small boat fisheries on the same stocks were certified sustainable by MSC in 2009 as the “inshore fishery on Canadian northern prawn”. 

The shrimp fishery on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland (NAFO Divisions 3LNO, Canadian Shrimp Fishing Area 7) was considered separately in the certification process because it is a straddling stock that extends beyond the 200nm EEZ and is therefore managed by an RFMO, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).

Given the serial depletion of most Grand Bank fisheries through rampant overfishing by Spain, Portugal, Canada and other nations over the last 60 years, one would think that sustainable management of the shrimp fishery by NAFO would be a high priority and that passing MSE certification would be a walk in the park.

Well, it was a walk in the park.  Moody International Marine Ltd., the for-profit consulting company that did the assessment under contract to the fishing industry, awarded the fishery scores of 84.4% for Principle 1 (Sustainability of Exploited Stock), 84% for Principle 2 (Maintenance of Ecosystem) and 81.6% for Principle 3 (Effective Management System). 

There were some low scores within these overall averages that led to conditions being placed on the sustainability determination.  The fishery is certified and products can carry the blue MSC logo, but to ensure ongoing certification MSC requires some progress to be demonstrated in annual audits by Moody towards improving these areas.

So where were some of the low scores?  Harvest control rules and tools – 70%.  Turns out there aren’t any.  Neither are there any exploitation targets or limits.  Fishery specific objectives (management objectives) – 60%.  Again, there aren’t any.

“Decision making processes” got a score of 80% and “Compliance and enforcement” got 90%. This is inconsistent with reality.

Scientific advice on a sustainable TAC for 2009 was 25kt.  NAFO went against the scientific advice and awarded a TAC of 30kt.  Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland did not agree to their share of the TAC and therefore set their own quota in excess of what they were allocated.  This is allowed under the NAFO Objection Clause.

Scientific advice for 2010 was that the current exploitation rate of 14% may be too high and scientists urged caution in the exploitation of the stock because it was declining.  They advised that exploitation rates should not be raised, but kept below recent levels.  Given that the stock was declining this would require a reduction in the TAC but NAFO decided to keep the TAC at 30kt.  Again the scientific advice was ignored.  Again Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland set their own quota in excess of their allocation.

Scientific advice for 2011 was that TAC options at 14% exploitation rate or higher would be associated with a relatively high risk of continued stock decline.  A 14% exploitation rate corresponded to a TAC of  17kt.  NAFO set the TAC for 2011 at 19.2kt.  Again the scientific advice was ignored.

The biomass of shrimp halved between 2007 and 2009.  This decline is expected to continue unless NAFO reduces the TAC in accordance with the scientific advice.  It doesn’t look like this is going to happen before it is too late…again.

How can this fishery be considered sustainable?  

MSC and the mackerel certification dilemma

The Marine Stewardship Council is facing a bit of a dilemma over its sustainability certification of NE Atlantic mackerel fisheries. 

MSC announced April 13 2011 that the independent adjudicator (retained under salary by MSC to hear objections) had decided to uphold an objection to the certification of the Faroese Pelagic Organisation North East Atlantic mackerel fishery to the MSC standard. 

The objection was lodged by Marine Scotland (government agency) against the assessment completed by the consulting company Det Norske Veritas.  The objection was that the Faroese fishery was not abiding by the management framework rules that were in place.

From 2000-2009 the Faroese were part of an international trilateral mackerel agreement with the EU and Norway which respected the scientific advice on sustainable catch levels provided by the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 

Recent changes in the distribution of mackerel in the NE Atlantic has made the stock more available and hence more attractive to Faroese and Icelandic fisheries and these two countries have unilaterally increased their catch levels outside ICES advice and the management framework. 

Unless the EU or Norway reduces their own catch, which they are unlikely to do, the total catch in 2011 will exceed ICES recommended sustainable levels and will put the resource at risk.   

Iceland does not seem to care because it is not certified by MSC nor is it applying for certification.  But what of the other mackerel fisheries?  There are 8 separate fisheries already certified by MSC and a 9^th in the assessment process.

fishnewseu.com reported on 13 April that MSC has stated that the decision should have no effect on already MSC certified mackerel fisheries which all fall within Norwegian or EU jurisdiction.

This contradicts an earlier MSC news release of July 16 2010 that “Unless the situation is resolved by the end of 2011, the unilateral quotas and increases in fishing activity will result in suspension of MSC certification of fisheries committed to harvesting the stock sustainably.”

So which is it?  Will all the mackerel fisheries be punished by MSC because two fisheries are being bad?

On the face of it, they should.  ICES considers the NE Atlantic Mackerel fishery to be one stock, albeit composed of three spawning components.  ICES estimates that fishing mortality has exceeded Fmsy (the fishing mortality that gives maximum sustainable yield) since the early 1990s, so technically NE Atlantic Mackerel already has overfishing taking place.  However, the biomass is relatively healthy, above MSY Btrigger, a biomass reference point that triggers a cautious response when stocks fall too far below Bmsy (the biomass associated with maximum sustainable yield). 

ICES estimates that catch in 2010 was 930kt and that this would have to be lowered to below 672kt in 2011 to be consistent with management objectives under the MSY approach.  This is unlikely to happen with Faroese and Icelandic fisheries not abiding by the rules. 

So now the dilemma: can the existing certified fisheries, who are abiding by the rules, still be considered sustainable if two non-certified fisheries are breaking the rules such that the sum of all the fisheries on NE Atlantic mackerel results in overfishing and stock depletion?

MSC is waffling on this issue. 

Turtles and sustainable swordfish

The Marine Stewardship Council deadline for stakeholder comments on the draft sustainability assessment report for the Canadian swordfish longline fishery is just days away. 

Although there are inadequacies in the scientific assessment of the swordfish stock and the management of the fishery by both ICCAT and Canada, swordfish are considered to be at or above the biomass that gives maximum sustainable yield and fishing mortality is below the level that achieves maximum sustainable yield.  In US fishery parlance, the stock is not overfished and neither is overfishing taking place.  On the face of it the primary requirements for consideration as a sustainable fishery under international best practices are met.

The big issue is bycatch of other species such as turtles and sharks. 

Concern is greatest for the loggerhead sea turtle.  Estimated bycatch in the Canadian pelagic longline fishery is about 1,200 turtles annually out of a population of 17,000.  This species was determined by COSEWIC to be endangered in Canada in April 2010 because it is “declining globally and there are well documented, ongoing declines in the Northwest Atlantic population from which juveniles routinely enter and forage in Atlantic Canadian waters. The Canadian population is threatened directly by commercial fishing, particularly bycatch in the pelagic longline fleet, and by loss and degradation of nesting beaches in the southeastern USA and the Caribbean.”

A decision by the Canadian Government on whether or not to list loggerheads under the Species at Risk Act has yet to be made.  In its initial response on December 2010, Government stated that “A voluntary Code of Conduct for Responsible Sea Turtle Handling and Mitigative Measures has been developed by the Canadian swordfish and tuna pelagic longline fleet.  This Code of Conduct includes measures such as avoiding areas of high sea turtle capture rates, gear hauling protocols to minimise harm to turtles, sea turtle handling guidelines, and usage instructions for de-hooking gear.”

A Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans recovery potential assessment published in 2010 found that “Reduction or elimination of mortality in Canadian waters alone is highly unlikely to be sufficient to achieve recovery.” 

Although not the sole culprit, and despite efforts being made in Canada to reduce bycatch and increase survival of released loggerheads, the Canadian longline swordfish fishery is contributing significantly to the potential extinction of loggerheads.

The Canadian harpoon fishery for swordfish has zero bycatch mortality and provides a certified sustainable alternative source for consumers to consider.

Marine Stewardship Council - Acceptable time frames for rebuilding depleted fish stocks

In the fall of 2010 MSC consulted with partners and stakeholders on acceptable rebuilding timeframes for certification of depleted stocks.  MSC defines a depleted stock as one which has a biomass below BMSY (the biomass that gives maximum sustainable yield) or equivalent target level, but is still above a precautionary limit level. Fisheries on stocks which are depleted can become MSC certified, however certification of such fisheries requires that there be a rebuilding plan in place which leads to the recovery of the stock within a specified timeframe.

The MSC Fisheries Assessment Methodology addresses rebuilding under Performance Indicator PI 1.1.3.  Currently, a conditional pass score of SG60 merely requires “reasonable expectation of success” with regard to rebuilding to the target biomass of BMSY within a specified timeframe.  

An unconditional pass of SG80 requires evidence that rebuilding strategies “are rebuilding stocks, or it is highly likely based on simulation modelling or previous performance that they will be able to rebuild the stock within a specified timeframe”.

A perfect score of SG100 requires that “strategies are demonstrated to be rebuilding stocks continuously and there is strong evidence that rebuilding will be complete within the shortest practicable timeframe”.

It is good that MSC is considering revising its methodology with regard to depleted stocks; however the consultation document only addresses a clearer definition of the timeframes for rebuilding to be associated with each of the three scores.

MSC certification of fisheries on depleted stocks as “sustainable” is highly controversial.  See for example the ongoing saga of the conditional certification of the fishery on the collapsed offshore South African hake stock. 

It can be argued that the current SG100 requirement should be the minimum required in order for a fishery to be considered for a conditional pass score (SG60) and that an unconditional pass score (SG80 or 100) should only be given to a fishery on stock that has already rebuilt and is fluctuating around BMSY or above under a fishing mortality of FMSY or lower (the fishing mortality rate consistent with maintaining the stock at BMSY or above).

A fishery on a depleted stock should never be considered sustainable.   

MSC Surveillance audit – South African hake trawl fishery

It is one year into the recertification of the South African hake trawl fishery.  Moody Marine Ltd has sent a team to South Africa to undertake the first surveillance audit of the fishery as required under the MSC eco-certification procedure.

The recertification the South African hake trawl fishery was not plain sailing for Moody.  The unit of certification includes an inshore and an offshore fishery component on different species.  The offshore hake, Merluccius paradoxus, is the main contributor to the fishery.  It is in a collapsed state and did not improve during the previous certification period.

One of the independent reviewers of the Moody recertification strongly argued against calling a fishery “sustainable” when one of the components remains in a severely depleted state.  This was overruled by Moody in their assessment, but did lead to “Condition 1” in the certification – a requirement that a recovery trend be demonstrated in M. paradoxus within the certification period.

So is there evidence that M. paradoxus is recovering?  It is hard to tell.  The last public-domain stock assessment document is a 2008 paper by Rademeyer and colleagues at the MARAM consulting company based in the Mathematics Department of the University of Cape Town.  This assessment showed the spawning biomass trajectory up to 1999 and there is no evidence of rebuilding. 

The Moody 2010 certification report provides the public with a rare look at the assessment process and the state of the stock. According to the report “models developed and implemented by MCM and its contractors are subjected to various reviews and debates through MCM’s Demersal Working Group. Industry, through their consultants, participate in the debates of the Working Group and have been influential in guiding the research.”

MCM is the South African federal government department of Marine and Coastal Management.  MCM is a bit of a black hole.  Nothing in the way of useful information is released to the public.  The “contractor” to MCM is MARAM.  MARAM developed the assessment model and also carry out the assessments using the model, apparently because of a lack of quantitative expertise at MCM.  MARAM is also responsible for the development of the Operational Management Procedure which is used by MCM to manage the stock.  MARAM does not produce public documents related to its contracts with MCM.

The assessment in the Moody certification report extends the spawner biomass series to 2007.  Spawning Stock Biomass continues to decline, reaching the lowest estimated level ever.  Projections under the MARAM management procedure predict that recovery will take place following 2007, however such projected recoveries are notoriously optimistic and routinely get postponed in subsequent assessments.  There needs to be actual realized evidence of recovery to satisfy Condition 1, not merely a projection.

One assumes that the Moody team for the current hake surveillance audit will have MARAM and MCM documents at their disposal in order to evaluate whether or not Condition 1 is being met.  

There should be full public disclosure by Moody of all relevant MCM and MARAM documents on M. paradoxus used in the audit, otherwise the public are being kept in the dark and have a right to be suspicious.

A comment on the NE Atlantic mackerel objection

From the comment section - the following anonymous comment on the NE Atlantic mackerel certification raises some interesting issues and is repeated here.


Two things strike me regarding this. 


Firstly, MSC has always said that it is not directly involved in decisions regarding who gets certified and who does not. It argues that it merely sets the standard for the assessment criteria and then it is up to an independent consulting company to determine if a fishery meets the standard. The proclamation on the MSC website regarding removal of certification by 2012 unless the whole NE Atlantic mackerel fishery meets the standard sounds like direct interference in the process to me.


Secondly, the concept that not only the enterprises seeking certification need to be abiding by the criteria, but also those outside the certification, will pose problems for other fisheries currently seeking certification, such as the offshore northern shrimp fishery of Newfoundland/Labrador. In this fishery Faroe Islands have unilaterally increased their own shrimp quota outside the overall quota set by the responsible RFMO, NAFO.

NE Atlantic mackerel – MSC policies and international governance

The NE Atlantic mackerel fishery is presenting some interesting insights into the evolving policies of the Marine Stewardship Council and its relationship with existing governance structures.

It can be argued that Marine Stewardship Council  eco-certification program only has added value in situations where national and international fisheries governance structures are not doing their job of conserving fisheries and ecosystems through sustainable management in the interests of long-term public good.

Given the poor practices of many governments in both developed and developing nations, and regional fisheries management organizations, there has been much for MSC to get their teeth into over the last 10 years.  Some of the cases they have taken on have been controversial – best known of all being the recent Ross Sea Antarctic Toothfish fishery certification.  This fishery is in international waters and is being pursued by a number of fleets from around the world.  A subset of these fleets applied for certification and achieved it despite strong objections from conservation groups (but not the responsible RFMO, CCAMLR).  Other fleets outside of the certification engaged in the same fishery have reputations as pirates and rogues responsible for serial collapses of the conspecific Patagonian Toothfish fisheries in various parts of the world.  This did not seem to matter to MSC then.

But it matters now.  MSC has announced that unilateral quotas and increases in fishing activity by Faroese and Icelandic fisheries on NE Atlantic mackerel will result in suspension of MSC-certification for those seven fisheries already certified.  Ongoing certification and any new certifications of fisheries on this stock will require establishment of a mechanism for monitoring and managing the combined catch of all the nations before the end of 2011. If not, all seven certificates will be suspended in January 2012.

The mackerel bubble was burst, not by an environmental organization but by the tweed jackets at Marine Scotland, part of the core Scottish Government set up in 2009 to manage Scotland's waters.  They recently ponied up the £5,000 required to object to the assessment by the for-profit consulting company Det Norske Veritas that the Faroese mackerel fishery smelt like roses.

So two three things of note (1) MSC threatens removal of certification unless the whole fishery including those not in the program are behaving; (2) A government challenges the outcome of the MSC process; and (3) An objection is actually sustained by the MSC appointed Independent Adjudicator.

Too bad about the Ross Sea Antarctic Toothfish though.

De-coding eco-labels, flaws and inadequacies - Food&WaterWatch

Food&WaterWatch describes a number of flaws and inadequacies with eco-certification and eco-lables in their recent publication De-coding Seafood Eco-Labels: Why we need Public standards.

Two issues that stand out are whether the public or private sector should oversee eco-certification and the certification of flawed fisheries.

Private sector eco-certification, for example the program run by the Marine Stewardship Council, limits the public right to fully determine the standards and conditions related to the labeling of their own property, the fish in the ocean.  If governments and RFMO's lived up to their responsibility to ensure only sustainable fisheries are permitted, there would be no need for expensive private sector certification schemes to second-guess the process.

Certification of flawed fisheries on condition that they undertake to improve and become sustainable in the future is very controversial.  As Food&WaterWatch point out - this deception regarding a sustainable fishery can be exploited by "free-riders" who get to ride on the reputation of the label.   Nobody should purchase a Toyota that is provisionally deemed safe provided the company figures out a way of fixing that brake problem over the next couple of years!

MSC Certification Fail! St Helena pole & line and rod & line tuna fisheries

The MSC accredited certifying body (CB) Food Certification International Ltd based in Inverness, Scotland, has given the St Helena Island pole & line and rod & line tuna fisheries for albacore, bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack tuna a failing grade for MSC certification as a sustainable fishery.  The assessment was carried out using the qualitative Risk Based Assessment approach developed by MSC for data-poor stocks.  The CB failed the fisheries on all four tuna stocks under Principle 1: Sustainability of Exploited Stock.

Should the St Helena fishery wish to still pursue certification, it is required by the CB to ensure that a number of improvement are carried out in order to achieve a passing score under Principle 1.  These include the development and implementation of target and limit reference points as well as harvest strategies incorporating harvest control rules that respond to the state of the stock relative to the reference points.

Other fisheries have in the past been certified by MSC as sustainable while having conditions applied requiring improvements in these areas.  This is only the second fishery that has entered full MSC certification to not reach a successful conclusion (the other was apparently a UK lobster fishery some time ago).  Does this "fail" indicate a new approach by MSC in response to mounting public criticism that "conditionally sustainable" does not make sense (a fishery should meet all sustainability conditions before it is certified sustainable)?  Or is it just the result of a consulting company that lacks the business savvy of successful certifying bodies such as Moody Marine Ltd?

MSC’s ball – the eco-certification game

The recent Pew Environmental Group criticisms and email campaign directed at the controversial certification of the Southeast North Atlantic swordfish, yellowfin and bigeye tuna fisheries based in Florida drew a strong defence from Jim Humphreys, MSC Fisheries, Regional Director Americas, in a posting on the MSC website. 

Humphrey’s posting was picked up by Natalia Real in a FIS.com editorial  20 August 2010 (“Pew's email campaign misleading: MSC”), prompting Lee Crockett, Director of Federal Fisheries Policy for the Pew Environment Group (PEG), to submit a response to FIS.com in the form of an opinion piece.

Humphreys defends the independence of the certification process arguing that “The MSC does not conduct the fishery assessment and the MSC remains impartial throughout the process, which is crucial to preserving the trust and reliability that come from an independent, third-party assessment, and maintaining the global credibility of the MSC certification program.”

According to Crockett, MSC elaborated on its “independence” in correspondence with him, stating that “the assessment of the fishery is independent of the MSC - the MSC doesn't take part in the scoring and determination of a fishery assessment.”  The implication seems to be that the MSC is absolved of any blame when an assessment ends up drawing public criticism.  Simply put, “Don’t blame me hey, I didn’t do it!” Non est mea culpa! The finger should rather be pointed at the consulting company (accredited to the MSC Standard) that undertook the assessment.

Crocket quite rightly takes issue with this claim: “In fact, MSC developed the entire assessment process and the criteria used for the assessment. Moreover, after a fishery is certified, it is eligible to display the MSC label, not the logo of the company that conducted the assessment, in this case MRAG Americas. To use a sports analogy, the fishery applying for and paying for certification plays the entire game on the MSC’s field, using the MSC’s ball, the MSC’s rules, in order to receive the MSC’s prize. The MSC is clearly not a disinterested third party.”

Not only that, any public objection to the sustainability determination is also played on the MSC’s field with the MSC’s ball, with an MSC salaried “referee”, the Independent Adjudicator!  Objectors to controversial sustainability determinations have yet to win a game.  

Ross Sea Toothfish Fishery Certified Sustainable

A controversial fishery in the pristine Ross Sea has been certified as sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) based on very little scientific evidence.  

The MSC's "Independent Adjudicator", Michael Lodge, has overturned public objections to the certification based on the assurances of a private consulting company, Moody Marine Ltd, contracted by by a group of fishing companies to prove that their portion of  the exploratory Ross Sea fishery is sustainable and worthy of the MSC eco-label.  Note that other nations involved in this fishery not covered by the certification have previously been identified as being involved in pirate fishing leading to the collapse of other toothfish stocks.  

Scientists claim that too little is known about the population dynamics of Ross Sea toothfish and the potential impact of catches to properly determine what would constitute a sustainable fishery.  Toothfish are highly vulnerable to overfishing as demonstrated by the collapse of a number of stocks.  

With this ruling MSC further lowers the bar (see other controversial certifications) on the evidence required to determine sustainability against it's standard.  It provides support to the perverse notion of "fish now and do the science later" - the antithesis of a sustainable approach.  

Consumers should exercise caution in accepting the MSC eco-label as evidence of a sustainably managed fishery and in particular avoid all toothfish or sea bass products.

Score jiggling under the MSC process to ensure fisheries sustainability certification?

Do third party MSC accredited Certifying Bodies jiggle scores to ensure a Pass on sustainability when responding to critical public comments, independent reviews and formal objections?

This issue has been raised recently by the Objection to the certification of the Faroese Pelagic Organisation North-East Atlantic Mackerel Fishery by Marine Scotland.  Marine Scotland is the lead marine management organisation in Scotland, bringing together the functions of the Fisheries Research Services (Marine Scotland Science), the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (Marine Scotland Compliance) and the Scottish Government Marine Directorate.

The Independent Adjudicator appointed by the Marine Stewardship Council to evaluate the objection, Melanie Carter, posted a notice on the MSC website dated 3 September 2010 outlining a query on the revision of the score on one of the fishery Performance Indicators by the Certifying Body Det Norske Veritas.

In responding to the objection by Marine Scotland, Det Norske Veritas had revised down the score for PI 3.1.1 to 65 resulting in the overall score for Principle 3 going down to 79.9.  This is a Fail under Principle 3 and therefore a Fail in terms of Sustainability determination under the MSC process.

When Melanie Carter pointed out this blunder to Det Norske Veritas they immediately responded “Our Assessment teams did not intend failing the fishery but we did overlook the effect of the rescoring on the weighting table (the total scores). DNV has been in contact with both experts [on the assessment team] yesterday and today. The assessment team wishes to rescore PI 3.1.1 to 70 giving it a total of 80,5.”  

This looks a lot like subjective score jiggling to ensure a Pass.

This brings to mind a previous case of alleged score jiggling under the MSC eco-certification process.  The controversial “skin-of-the-teeth” 2006/2007 sustainability assessment of the NZ Hoki fishery by SGS Netherlands resulted in a formal objection by NZ WWF in July 2006.  WWF claimed that there was “a procedural failure, because the Final Report does not provide enough evidence to show how the assessment team derived the scores for Performance Indicators that were changed between the Public Comment Draft Report and the Final Report.”

The allegation is that in responding to critical WWF comments on the Public Comment Draft report, SGS revised down some of the scores, but to compensate other PI scores, not subject to criticism by WWF, were revised up to ensure that an overall passing score was retained under each of the 3 Principles.

Recall that no fishery that has gone through the secret MSC pre-assessment process into full assessment has failed to achieve a Pass on Sustainability (except for a UK lobster fishery which fell out of the certification process at some point, possibly lack of funds to pay the CB?). Further recall that no public comment, independent peer review or formal objection has resulted in the overturning of a Certification Body Sustainability Determination.